THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GRUNWALD PATRIOTIC UNION
by Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka
Summary: Since its foundation some time after August 1980, the self-styled Grunwald Patriotic Union has drawn public attention mainly on account of its secretiveness and its anachronistic and irrelevant anti-Semitism, which met with almost universal repugnance. Its continued existence throughout 1981 and even after the proclamation of martial law on 13; December 1981 suggests that it enjoyed protection at the highest level and was being used for political purposes by undisclosed forces. Recently, however, Grunwald has become plagued with infighting, provocation, and petty harassment, all of which points to the conclusion that it has now served its purpose and is in the process of being scuttled.
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Economic and political crises favor both the formation of organizations of a radical type and the disintegration of existing organizations into diverse factions. As a rule, such a process evolves over many years and is a reflection of the social moods or of individuals' overgrown ambitions. The Grunwald Patriotic Union . . . was long in gestation before it was finally born, not without the protection of persons highly placed in the political hierarchy.
This material was prepared for the use of the staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
These words, written one year ago in Poland, strike one as being particularly pertinent today. The so-called Grunwald
Patriotic Union (GPU) appeared virtually out of thin air on 8 March 1981 commemorating "the victims of Zionist terror" that allegedly reigned from 1948 to 1953, was registered almost surreptitiously on 25 April 1981, and then proceeded to make increasingly brazen nationalistic and antidemocratic statements amid a storm of self-generated publicity. At first, the public responded with bemusement and disbelief, but these feelings gradually turned into disgust and even alarm as it began to dawn on people that, even though the Jaruzelski leadership not only failed to endorse Grunwald's pronouncements but had even initially condemned them, Grunwald was under the protection of some influential if mysterious patron. The name of former Politburo member and CC Secretary in charge of Propaganda Stefan Olszowski was linked at one time to the GPU, but he has always maintained a respectable distance from it. The only official publication to come out with undisguised approval of Grunwald was Rzeczywistosc, the weekly of the Warsaw 80 Club for Creative Party Intelligentsia, a forum for party hard-liners. The information was even leaked that there was controversy over Grunwald within the Politburo. After it was registered, Poland's prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski and his close associates did not mention Grunwald again, almost as if they were hoping to diminish its significance in this way. Jaruzelski's adviser Wieslaw Gornicki, himself a target of Grunwald attacks, said in an interview with the Zagreb fortnightly Start that Jaruzelski despised anti-Semitism but justified the fact that Grunwald was able to continue its existence by saying that many of its members were respected army veterans who, though their mentality was "petrified in thinking about the glory of the fatherland," had in the past displayed real valor and rendered great services to the country and therefore could not simply be dismissed out of hand. When martial law was proclaimed, Grunwald was not suspended but was allowed to continue its activities, apparently enjoying the same privileges as a select few party appendages, such as the Socialist Polish Youth Union. In fact, martial law was in many ways a boon for Grunwald, whose Chairman Bohdan Poreba admitted shortly afterward: "So far, we have not been given the chance to speak openly. Now, we will get that opportunity."
The Genealogy. The organization's origins, membership, and operations are still shrouded in mystery even today. It was only ex post facto that Grunwald spokesmen produced, for the sake of public relations, a genealogy going back to the taking of Berlin in 1945 when the so-called Kosciuszko Division, created by General Zygmunt Berling, part of the First Army of the Soviet sponsored Polish Armed Forces, fought side-by-side with Soviet troops. The GPU has called this event "a second Battle of Grunwald" -- the first having been the memorable victory of 1410 when the Poles and Lithuanians dealt a decisive defeat to the Knights of the Teutonic Order -- bending the facts of both events to fit a fanciful "Slavonic versus Germanic" theory. In fact, the 1410 battle was fought not by some kind of ethnic alliance but by a state formed by the union of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Crown under the Lithuanian Wladyslaw Jagiello, a political entity that also included some Ruthenian territories. Similarly, the taking of Berlin was no Slavonic undertaking but one part of the coordinated allied offensive against Nazi Germany in the final stages of World War II. According to the Grunwald Union-perpetrated legend, after the war the youngest veterans of the First Army set up a Reserve Officers, club, which was disbanded in the Stalinist era. They continued their activities after 1956 as Friends of the First Army of the Polish Armed Forces, under the patronage of General Berling who, after falling from grace, had since been rehabilitated. They were known unofficially as the Berlingowcy Club. Though they undertook no direct actions, they trained cadres of activists and ideologists in the expectation of a climate more favorable to their activities in the future.
The idea of setting up a Grunwald Union was apparently born at the funeral of "Berling on 15 July 1980 -- coinciding, as it happened, with the 570th anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald -- though it was some time later, after the August 1980 agreements had created a new political climate, that the GPU was actually formed. Even this fact cannot be established with full certainty, however, for sources variously set the date of foundation as 12 October and 12 December 1980. After Berling's death, the Berlingowcy turned for patronage to Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski, commander of the underground communist guerrilla forces, known as the People's Army, during the occupation and a Commander- in-Chief of the Polish People's Army immediately after the war; he was imprisoned under Stalin, but later rehabilitated. Berling, with his communist-nationalistic political testament, remained, however, the spiritual leader of Grunwald.
The Organization. Finding facts to fit a leaend was straightforward enough, but creating an organization proved a more difficult task. Shortly after the organization -- allegedly numbering 100,000 members -- was registered, the press announced the addresses or telephone numbers of GPU organizing committees and initiative groups. In fact, many of these proved to be quite false. The person named as the contact in Poznan, for example, indignantly denied having anything to do with such an organization. The "branch" based at the House of Culture attached to the Szczecin foundry turned out to be one person. The address of the Huta Warszawa Steelworks was given as the national headquarters of the organization, and a minor scandal ensued when it transpired that no one -- not the management, nor the local party organization, nor the local Solidarity chapter -- knew anything about the existence of such an organization at the steelworks. It was finally traced to the club for retired employees. The local Grunwald organizer and a representative of the central GPU authorities claimed at a special meeting that the local organization numbered "over 100 members," but refused to divulge the real number or how many of them were full-time employees of the steelworks. The GPU's "national headquarters" were unceremoniously thrown out of the plant and were finally allocated a temporary office up an alleyway behind a hairdressers' shop In the Nowy Swiat district of downtown Warsaw. Journalists trying to track down the Grunwald organization remarked on how difficult it was to find anyone admitting to be a rank-and-file member, although by August 1981 the GPU was claiming a membership of 250,000 -- people of all ages, backgrounds, and professions, including Catholic activists and even "ministers of various denominations," What members there were seemed to be associated with the army, the reserve, the official war veterans ' association ZBoWid, and the paramilitary National Defense League.
It is interesting that, from the outset, all information about Grunwald was supplied exclusively by the state news agency, PAP; and the short dispatches were always unsigned, confined to quoting the central authorities of the GPU. When individual journalists or papers and periodicals wanted to discover something more, they invariably found that the only sources of information were GPU Chairman Poreba and Secretary Zdzislaw Ciesiolkiewicz. It was only toward the end of last June that some local representatives of Grunwald were rustled up, and even then interviews were given as if grudgingly and after "vetting" the prospective interviewer (presumably according to ethnic and other criteria). The reporters did not pull their punches, and it is significant that most of them asked the same three direct questions: What is Grunwald's real membership? What is its attitude to persons of Jewish stock? and Who is behind the organization? Without batting an eye, Poreba and Ciesiolkiewicz responded with dodges, generalizations, and word-spinning. Even the persistent reporter of Tygodnik Solidarnosc was fobbed off with "pproximate" numbers and the magnificent protestation, "We do have membership lists, but not at the moment," while the correspondent of The Guardian was told, with superb self-confidence, "we represent the interests of 50,000,000 Poles throughout the world." The charges of anti-Semitism were rejected (see below). As for who was behind Grunwald, Poreba baldly denied that his organization was an instrument in anyone's hands and, with an air of outraged innocence, claimed the right to freedom of conscience and a patriotic duty to work for the good of the country.
Officially, Grunwald was headed by an interim National Organizing Committee (NOC) presided over by Bohdan Poreba, a filmmaker well-known for his record of loyalty to the party's dogmatic cultural policies as well as for his anti-Semitic sentiments, and long ostracized by the film-makers' profession. In the first open and democratic voting for the eight teams that were to be sponsored by the state, the Polish Film-Makers' Association, in March of last year, rejected Profil and Krakow, the two teams headed by Poreba and his kindred spirit, Ryszard Filipski, respectively. Poreba was also a member of the Warszawa 80 Club. NOC Secretary Zdzislaw Ciesiolkiewicz is a little known journalist and author of an anti-Semitic pamphlet entitled "Invasion of Ghosts" and subtitled "1944-1970 -- On the Contribution of Jewish Chauvinists to the History of Contemporary Poland." The pamphlet was published unofficially at the author's personal expense in 1979, and a second edition was brought out the following year. The only other member of the NOC about whom anything is known is Kazimierz Cwojda, a reserve colonel and author of a denunciatory "open letter" written on 15 April 1968 to the Fifth PUWP Congress Commission and containing a long list of names of alleged "Zionists" in the public eye in Poland.
The Ideological Profile. The exact scope and nature of Grunwald's activities have also proved very difficult to define. The early pronouncements of Poreba and Ciesiolkiewicz were vague and ambiguous. Beyond the pseudopatriotic and demagogic slogans, it is difficult to perceive any substance or any concrete program in their statements. The only official Grunwald document known to date is the "Ideological and Political Declaration" adopted at its first national congress. This defines Grunwald as a "social and cultural association for Poles opting with determination for the defense of Polish national and state interests." Why a social and cultural movement should need to make a political declaration is not immediately obvious, until one considers the statements made by the GPU leaders. Poreba himself, though insisting on its social and cultural character elsewhere, spoke of his own activity as the chairman of Grunwald as of a political involvement, while the head of the Olsztyn Region Board, a certain Mr. Witkowski, stated outright: "It is not a political party, but a political union."
The declaration recognizes Poland's political system and alliances, as well as the leading role of the PUWP; supports the reformed labor movement; and acknowledges "the important role played by the Roman Catholic Church in the process of molding patriotism and the respect of all the nationalities within Polish society," while respecting -- "in keeping with the principles of internationalism -- the rights of Poles of other denominations, as well as Polish atheists." It combats "German revisionism, every kind of chauvinism, whether Polish or alien, including anti-Semitism and Zionism which, in keeping with the resolution of the UN, is one of the forms of contemporary racism, perceiving in its activities one of the causes of profound crises." It is important to understand that Grunwald in fact embraces anti-Semitism while pretending to repudiate it by viewing it through a distorting mirror, as it were: according to its own line of thinking, it is not discriminating against the Jewish nation but defending its own nation against alleged discrimination by worldwide Jewry. This preposterous theory amounts to ascribing to people of Jewish stock efforts to support some imaginary and unspecified common "Zionist" interests that are supposed to be in conflict with those of other peoples.
For their part, the representatives of the GPU have repeatedly denied all charges of anti-Semitism, beginning with a statement issued by the NOC on 4 June 1981 in reply to a protest from the Polish Jews' Social and Cultural Association and with a statement by the West Pomeranian Regional Board on 12 November 1981, as well as in various interviews. The flat denial of anti-Semitism was, however, usually accompanied by a telling rider. To quote but a few examples: in an interview with The Times, Poreba said "Anti-Semitism is totally alien to us." But he went on, "at the same time, it is clear that Jews were more active in the security services after the war than was warranted by their proportional presence in the population." West Pomeranian Regional Board Deputy Chairman Zdzislaw Romanowski told the local daily, "imputing that we are anti-Semitic is nonsense, thought up by Jewish nationalism, which is brought into play when the intention is to attack someone." When pressed to the wall by the Tygodnik Solidarnosc reporter, the GPU chairman in Huta Warszawa said only "true Poles" could belong to the union and when asked whether Jews could belong, he answered, "If someone is of Jewish stock, it is up to him; but I think that such a person would give up after two or three meetings."
Grunwald's program of activities is as nebulous as are its patriotic declarations. This program is to be built "according to the models of national historical tradition" and aims at the following areas:
1. The education of the younger generation and the molding of national awareness "on the basis of the Polish national ethos";
2. Supplying information about "the historical truth" about past and contemporary Poles, both "those who served the country well and those who brought it harm";
3. The setting up of "study groups, commissions, and institutes" to study Polish history "scientifically";
4. The use of the media in order to realize Grunwald's "ideological program";
5. Restoration of honor to past "heroes";
6. Aid for those who met with "injustice" for their struggle to ensure "Polishness and an independent Polish state";
7. Active participation in political life with equal opportunities for all citizens and against "trends toward the unjustified hegemony of groups and cliques based on common professional, family or ethnic interests.
Taken at face value, this declaration might seem quite unobjectionable, but it is obviously permeated with prejudice and tendentiousness, which gives it an implied meaning. When confronted with the argument that the position of Grunwald was somewhat unclear and did not inspire confidence, Poreba replied that the GPU stood for socialism and Polishness. Indeed, Grunwald has become popularly known as "red nationalism," harking back to the prewar extreme rightwing National Democratic Party. Poreba went on to explain that this meant Grunwald favored "a Polish road to socialism," around which national unity might be forged. The term is, however, misleading, since Poreba does not mean Polish as distinct from Soviet, with its tolerance of the Roman Catholic Church, private farming, and a relatively open cultural policy, but Polish as opposed to "cosmopolitan." In the contemporary context, Poreba said, the GPU was for reforms in public life, but under conditions of peace and stability, and was against "those forces within the party and outside of it that want to make antinational capital out of our common misfortune."
So far, Grunwald's only concrete undertakings, apart from the regular meetings of its central authorities, seem to be the renaming of a street in honor of General Berling, steps to publish his memoirs, the commissioning of a "report on the state of the national culture" (as if the totality of Polish creative work could be split up and evaluated according to ethnic criteria), and the proposal, whose authorship they claim, that the ashes of Polish World War II Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in Exile General Wladyslaw Sikorski be transferred from Great Britain to Poland, an idea that led to great embarrassment for the PPR authorities when the British government refused.
The Scandals. Grunwald's appeals for national' unity strike a comic note when one looks at the organization's own record. The series of scandals began shortly before its first national congress, called surprisingly soon after its registration, for 4 and 5 July 1981. On the eve of the meeting, PAP announced that the congress had been put off until August 1, to coincide with the anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, "at the request of several voivodship delegations." It seems strange that the congress of an organization that allegedly had over 100,000 members could have been called off at one day's notice, when one considers the enormity of administrative preparations and the expenses involved. Moreover, a great many of the delegates, as it later transpired from a report in the provincial press, had arrived in Olsztyn (which had been chosen as the venue in preference to the capital, apparently because of the proximity of the original Grunwald Battlefield, but possibly to shield it from the glare of publicity) as they had not been notified of the change in good time. After many hours of uproar, it was finally decided to hold the congress anyway. What really happened is still unclear: Was the change of date a bona fide piece of information'? Was the entire incident a "provocation,?" Or was it the result of internal manipulation? The truncated congress elected a 96-member Chief Council headed by Poreba and a host of unknowns, and a 31-member National Board headed by Ciesiolkiewicz, who was also confirmed as Editor-in-Chief of the GPU's weekly publication Grunwald. Cwojda was named Secretary-General. There was no information as to the division of responsibilities between the Chief Council and the National Board, and both Poreba and Ciesiolkiewicz continued to appear as the GPU's two main spokesmen, though, with time, it began to appear as though the Chief Council carried greater weight. The congress also adopted the "Ideological and Political Declaration" and set up a special commission to examine the circumstances in which the first issue of Grunwald was prevented from appearing. The congress then adjourned and it was decided to hold a second round in August, when "all the delegates" would be present. It is not known how many people actually attended the congress, nor how many were absent, whether there was a quorum, and what the reaction was of those not present to the decisions taken behind their backs. The very fact that such a situation occurred suggests that the decisions were made in advance and the congress was never meant to do more than serve as a rubber stamp.
Preparations for the second round of the congress began to drag; and, suddenly, on 4 September 1981, the second scandal erupted: Ciesiolkiewicz was dismissed from the post of Chairman of the National Board for undisclosed reasons. He was replaced as interim chairman by Cwojda, who was later confirmed in this post by the second round of the congress, while Roman Dudzinski was appointed Secretary-General. It was only on 10 December 1981 that some further -- albeit incomplete -- light was shed on the matter: a laconic PAP announcement said that Ciesiolkiewicz had now been expelled from the GPU "for activity contrary to the provisions of its statutes." One can only guess that this phrase refers to factional activity.
The second round of the congress also began with an uproar created over the circulation of an allegedly alien and provocative, overtly anti-Semitic pamphlet. This may well have been so, but one cannot exclude the possibility that it was set up by Grunwald itself to provide an alibi and "proof" of its innocence, for the atmosphere and proceedings of the October 11 second round, as a Slowo Powszechne journalist has shown, were nothing if not anti-Semitic. This was not, however, reflected in the brief PAP summary, which stressed the formal aspects of the congress: the registration of 23 regional and voivodship divisions, the adoption of a program for the next 3 years (undisclosed), amendments to the statutes (also undisclosed), and an appeal to the nation for "restoration of moral order" and the raising of national culture "to the rank of a factor molding human attitudes."
The next affair occurred in Lpdz where there suddenly appeared two rival Grunwalds which fought it out, not through the GPU's internal channels but on the pages of the local party daily, with accusations and counter accusations about usurpation. The conflict was finally settled after meetings with the central GPU authorities when the newer "founding committee" joined the already established Lodz District Board. It was never explained, however, how it was possible that someone was given the go-ahead from the central Grunwald authorities to form a branch in Lodz when a recognized branch was already in existence.
In July 1982 members of the Grunwald authorities received announcements giving false dates for their plenary meeting and a correction had to be broadcast over the national radio network. Finally, a special meeting was called to discuss the internal situation within the GPU. A vote of confidence was taken in favor of the presidiums of both the Chief Council and the National Board and in favor of Chairman Poreba in particular. A communique issued by the meeting said that all attempts to split the organization were to be condemned and announced that, after examining the activities of "a subversive group trying to hide under the cloak of the so-called initiating group" which had ceased to exist with the constitutional congress in July 1981, all the members of this group had been removed from the Chief Council and expelled from the organization.
Most recently, after the weekly Polityka published an article ridiculing Poreba's two-month public relations drive through the seaside resorts, it received and published a formal announcement signed for the "Executive Office of the National Board of the GPU" by Jerzy Widawski and bearing the official stamp, that Poreba was no longer Chairman of the Chief Council of Grunwald and had been replaced by General Franciszek Cymbarewicz. This sparked an instant formal protest signed by National Board Secretary-General Dudzinski and also bearing the official stamp. Dudzinski wrote that both the signature and the stamp of Widawski had been invalidated on August 23 and that Poreba was still in charge. The epilogue to this bizarre episode is undoubtedly still to come.
Who Is Behind Grunwald? The question still remains: who is behind Grunwald? Some pointers may be gleaned from an analysis of Grunwald's attitude to Solidarity. While Solidarity was officially tolerated and lip service was paid to it as having been born of the workers' just anger and as being the nation's hope for reform, the GPU was careful not to criticize it nor to come into conflict with it. West Pomeranian Regional Board Deputy Chairman Marian Kasprzyk even claimed, perversely, "We are aware that without the post-August changes there could be no question of creating Grunwald so, in a sense, we are a child of Solidarity . . . only an illegitimate one, . . ." Although Lech Walesa himself said that, for him, Grunwald was "some kind of science fiction," Poreba and his associates claimed to set great store by winning the confidence of Solidarity and its support for their activities. They countered the argument that Solidarity had actually warned its members against the GPU by insisting that there were many Solidarity members in the ranks of Grunwald and that other members of Solidarity would surely, in time, be won over when they realized that "there was more to unite Grunwald and Solidarity than there was dividing them." This did not prevent the GPU from making rallies against so-called "extremists" in Solidarity and from accusing the independent union of succumbing to "Zionist" influences and misleading Poland's youth. It made no secret of its dislike for KSS "KOR" as a whole and its individual members. That same Kasprzyk said, "Our attitude to KOR is absolutely negative. There are many Zionists in that organization." The GPU actually tried to establish that KOR members and associates were linked, either directly or throucrh family and ethnic ties, to Polish Stalinists and raised the specter of a constant threat to the system from "a continuum stretching from the security service interrogators of the 1950s to Solidarity activists in the 1980s." In an interview with the Zagreb fortnightly Start, Poreba was still more explicit in his slanderous accusations: "Solidarity was used by former Stalinists as an instrument to assume power," and some people in Solidarity were trying "to create a mythology for the obscure people from the Stalinist era who have today merely changed their facade."
All the evidence is that there is more to Grunwald than meets the eye. Its very anonymity raises suspicions. Its rabid pseudopatriotic nationalism, harnessed into the service of Soviet-style communist internationalism, its condemnation of Stalinism combined with advocation of hard-line policies, and the torrent of words of which it is impossible to make any sense amount to sheer madness; and yet, there is, objectively speaking, a method in it, which Polish observers have not been slow to notice.
First, Grunwald appeared at approximately the same time the Katowice Party Forum, the Warsaw 80 Club and its weekly Rzeczywistosc, and several other groups advocating dogmatic, hard-line policies to deal with Solidarity. This circumstance could have provided a handy alibi for the post-August 1980 ruling team which, in comparison, looked almost liberal and, by staging a fight against such "men of straw" as Grunwlld, could claim to be composed of moderates.
Secondly, a fictitious Zionist plot could serve as a smoke screen making it impossible to identify and fight the real enemies of democratic reform by deflecting social attention not only onto a sidetrack but into an altogether blind alley. Thirdly Grunwald claims to be the only "nonparty-aligned platform" in the country and could well serve to provide an opening for building a "broad social base" for the hard-line stream in the party, with which the GPU is obviously associated.
At the same time, Grunwald really cannot be taken seriously, founded as it is on a primitive attempt to oversimplify the tragedy of the first post-World War II years by reducing it to the evils of some imaginary Zionist plot and, once it has served it purpose, cannot but present, in the long run, an embarrassing burden for the PPR authorities. Perhaps this accounts for the unexplained affairs and petty harassment of the GPU which seem at first glance, simply to ridicule it still further but, in fact serve to divide the organization to the point where it disintegrates into personal squabbles and infighting.
With the founding of the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (PRON, according to its Polish acronym), moreover, Grunwald's very raison d'etre has been swept aside, for the PRON, which is destined ultimately to take over all the other existing platforms for cooperation between the people and the authorities, has the monopoly on patriotism, too, and makes the Grunwald Patriotic Union, at least formally, redundant.
 Tadeusz Bolduan, "Nationalists," Czas, 27 September 1981.
 See Polish Situation Reports/5 and 10, Radio Free Europe Research, 20 March 1981 and 11 June 1981, Items lb and 4, respectively.
 Bogdan Mozdzynski, "We Have Nothing To Hide," Sztandar Mlodvch, 5-7 June 1981.
 See Slobodan Stankovic, "Two Prominent 'Jaruzelski-Poles' Interviewed by Yugoslav Periodical," RAD Background Report/99 (Yugoslavia), RFER, 26 April 1982.
 Roger Boyes, The Times, 23 January 1982.
 West Pomeranian District Board Chairman Zdzislaw Romanowski expressed this succinctly: "The origin of Grunwald can also
be sought in the primeval desire of the Slavonic peoples for a strong commonwealth. The Battle of Grunwald was a symbol of that peoples' might. We must all understand that, when we are joined together with the ties of an alliance, the Slavonic nations can live and work safely." Maciej Czekala and Jacek Grazewicz, "Let Us Demystify History," Kurier Szczecinski, 25-27 September 1981.
 Michael Simmons, The Guardian, 3 August 1981, and Bolduan, op. cit_., respectively.
 Janusz Atlas, "What Grunwald Is After," Nowiny, 28-29 June 1981; Bolduan and Mozdzynski, op. cit.
 Czekala and Grazewicz, op. cit.
 Malgorzata Niezabitowska, "Cuckoo's Egg," Tygodnik Solidarnosc, 26 June 1981; and Simmons, op. cit.
 Jerzy Tomaszewski, "Defeat at Grunwald," Kultura, 19 July 1981; and Bolduan, op. cit.
 Plomienie, 12 July 1981.
 Anna Stronska, "Battle over Grunwald," Polityka, 5 December 1981.
 Official communist propaganda has from the outset magnified the real scope of "German revanchism," as the aspiration to retrieve lands returned to Poland after World War II was called. The object of this campaign is to diminish anti-Soviet sentiments by focusing on an alleged threat from the country's Western neighbor. With regard to the alleged threat of world Zionism, the UN resolution does not make the inference claimed by the GPU.
 Soviet publications have floated similar theories. In January the weekly Novoe Vremya, for example, said that the Israeli intelligence agency gave aid to "Zionist elements" in Solidarity to try to divert the world's attention away from the annexation of the Golan Heights.
 Boyes, op. cit.
 Czekala and Grazewicz, op. cit.
 Stronska, op. cit.
 Gazeta Olsztynska, 7 July 1981.
 The publication of the first issue, timed to coincide with the congress, was apparently prevented by the local Solidarity organization at the Olsztyn Printing Works on 2 July 1981 (Stronska, op. cit.). Since then no more seems to have been heard of it.
 Grzegorz Niegodzisz, "Poland in the Clutches," Slowo Powszechne,
16-18 October 1981.
 Glos Robotniczy, 23 and 30 September, 2-4 and 9-11 October 1981.
 Radio Warsaw, 7 July 1982, 1800 hours.
 Trvbuna Ludu, 12 September 1982.
 Polityka, 14 August, 4 and 11 September 1982.
 Stronska, op. cit.
 Czekala and Grazewicz, op. cit.
 Boyes, op. cit.
 Stankovic, op. cit.
 Piotr Wierzbicki, "How To Become a Liberal," Tygodnik Powszechny, 28 June 1981.
 Tadeusz Holuj quoted by Jerzy Handerek, "All Extremes Are Dangerous," Sztandar Mlodych. 5-7 June 1981.
 It is interesting to note, in this connection, that there is similar infighting in the Rzeczywistosc Association of Social and Political Knowledge Clubs that grew up around the weekly of the same name after its original sponsor; the Warsaw 80 Creative Party Intelligentsia Club, was dissolved by the party authorities; See Daniel Passent, "Masquerade,". Polityka 11 September 1982.
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